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Obamacare’s (3) Day(s) in Court
Abigail R. Moncrieff, JD

Before the oral arguments in late March, the vast majority of legal scholars felt confident that the
Supreme Court of the United States would uphold the individual mandate against the constitutional challenge that 26 states have levied against it. Since the oral arguments, that confidence
has been severely shaken. This article asks why legal scholars were so confident before the argument and what has made us so concerned since the argument. The article posits that certain
fundamental characteristics of health insurance, particularly its unusual role in steering healthcare consumption decisions, which distinguishes health insurance from standard kinds of indemnity insurance, should make the constitutional question easy, but the Obama Administration’s
legal team was understandably hesitant to highlight those unique characteristics in its arguments.
Because the Supreme Court justices seemed not to understand the uniqueness of health insurance without the government’s help and because the justices seemed unusually willing to adopt a
new constitutional constraint in this case, the individual mandate appears to be in far greater
jeopardy than we legal scholars anticipated.
CHEST 2012; 141(6):1389–1392
Abbreviations: ACA = Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

took 6 h, spread over 3 days, for the Supreme
ItCourt
to canvass the legal issues involved in the

constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 Six hours of lawyers’
presentations and justices’ questions, and they were
considering a case that most legal scholars thought
would be simple.2-8 Predicting outcomes from oral
arguments is a dangerous game, but one thing became
clear during the course of those 6 h: The case will not
be simple. This article asks and answers two questions: (1) Why were (most) legal scholars so confident
that the Supreme Court would find the individual
mandate constitutional? (2) What did we miss?
Part of the answer to these questions is straightforward. We were confident because we understood
the existing law and assumed that the Supreme Court
would abide by its precedents. We missed the possibility, which now seems significant, that the Supreme
Court would change the law, distinguishing its precManuscript received April 13, 2012; revision accepted April 13,
2012.
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edents, in order to find the individual mandate
unconstitutional.
Part of the answer, though, is subtler. Part of the
problem is that the relevant lawyers and legal scholars
simultaneously understood too much and too little
about American health care. We understand, in a way
that the Supreme Court justices apparently do not,
that health insurance is not normal insurance, that
in addition to aggregating risk like ordinary indemnity
insurance, health insurance provides a robust incentive structure to steer health-care consumption. We
do not understand, however, something that seems
crucially important to the litigation: that, because
health insurance steers consumption, a health insurance mandate feels like a substantial infringement
on personal freedom in a way that other kinds of
purchase incentives do not. This article fleshes out
those points in two parts, the first exploring the reasons for confidence before the argument and the second exploring the reasons for concern afterward.
Preargument Confidence
Before the oral argument, there was broad consensus among legal academics (not unanimous9-12 but
close) that the constitutional challenge to the individual mandate was meritless. Even after five federal
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Downloaded from chestjournal.chestpubs.org by guest on June 5, 2012
2012available
Americanat:
College
of Chest Physicians
Electronic ©copy
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2078200

1389

judges in the trial and appellate courts argued that
the individual mandate was unconstitutional,13-15 legal
scholars remained confident that the Supreme Court
would uphold the provision. Why? What was the
source of this widespread confidence?
The simple answer is that the invalidating judges
on the lower federal courts had deviated from longstanding precedent, and legal scholars thought it
unlikely that the Supreme Court justices would do
the same. The challenge to the individual mandate
centers primarily on the Commerce Clause,16 the
provision of the Constitution that allows Congress
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Since
the Supreme Court’s famous 1942 opinion in Wickard
v Filburn,17 the Commerce Clause has empowered
Congress to regulate not only actual interstate commerce (the movement of goods across state lines)
but also individual intrastate activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce (in Wickard, a farmer’s
decision to grow his own wheat instead of buying it
from the interstate commercial market). Under this
longstanding conception of the commerce power,
the legal question for the individual mandate should
be simply whether individual decisions to self-insure
substantially affect interstate commerce.
In more recent Commerce Clause cases, the
Supreme Court has clarified that the Wickard rule
allowing regulation of intrastate activity applies only
to economic activity. In United States v Lopez,18 the
Court invalidated a statute that prohibited individuals from carrying guns in school zones, arguing
that carrying a gun (as opposed to making, buying,
or selling a gun) is not an economic activity, and in
United States v Morrison,19 the Court invalidated
a provision of the Violence Against Women Act20 on
the ground that acts of domestic violence are not
economic acts. Even though the presence of guns in
schools and the prevalence of domestic violence in
society might have substantial effects on interstate
commerce, the Court held, Congress could not use
its commerce power to punish what amounted to
immoral or simply disfavored behavior. The impact
on commerce was too remote. Under these more
recent, refined precedents, then, the question for the
individual mandate should be whether the decision
to self-insure is an economic activity (rather than simply an immoral choice) that substantially affects interstate commerce.
And this is where it became a problem, at least for
predicting the Supreme Court’s reaction, that the
relevant legal scholars know too much about health
care. The answer we gave was that self-insurance is
obviously an active economic choice that substantially affects interstate commerce. But both parts of
that statement, both the notion that self-insurance is
an economic act and the notion that it affects com-

mercial markets, depend on the understanding that
health insurance is not ordinary insurance.
When an individual chooses not to buy health
insurance, he is not simply deciding to bear his own
risk, as he would if he chose not to buy homeowner’s
insurance, for example. Nor is he simply deciding
to bear the risk that he poses to himself and others,
as he would if he chose not to buy car, life, or burial
insurance. He is choosing both to bear his own risk
and to set his own incentives for health-care savings
and consumption, to rely solely on his own purse
strings to guide his purchase choices. He is rejecting the rarefied incentive structure that health insurance companies provide to their insured.
Health insurance performs three important functions beyond mere risk distribution. First, health
insurance forces individuals to save money for all
kinds of health care (including routine maintenance
and wear-and-tear, which car insurance, for example,
never covers) in a market in which optimism bias
causes individuals to save systematically too little
(a cognitive failure that does not exist for other
insured items like cars and homes).21,22 Second, health
insurance in the ACA world of community rating
forces individuals to smooth their health-care savings
over the course of their lives so that, from an actuarial perspective, they pay too much when young
and too little when old, a feature that most kinds of
insurance need not include because the risk associated with cars and homes does not vary so dramatically with the age of the insured. Finally and most
importantly, health insurance administrators set differential cost-sharing obligations, attempting to channel
their beneficiaries toward preventive care, primary
care, and generic pharmaceuticals (away from emergent care, specialty care, and brand-name drugs),
and insurance companies engage in medical necessity
review to try to curb wasteful spending on unnecessary care. Standard indemnity insurance does not do
that. Car insurance and homeowners’ insurance do
not manipulate incentives to improve consumption
decisions; they often do not even require the beneficiary to spend his indemnifying payment on repairs.
Self-insurance for health care, then, is not simply
a failure to buy insurance. It is a continuing economic activity of setting and following one’s own
incentives with respect to health-care consumption
rather than becoming subject to the insurance company’s salutary manipulations. (Insurance also causes
inefficiencies, most notably the moral hazard that
causes excessive consumption of costly care. Under
the constitutional test, though, Congress’s policy
choices do not need to be right or perfect; they need
only be rational. And Congress rationally could believe
that moral hazard costs less than underconsumption of preventive and primary care.) In addition, the
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effect of self-insurance on the health-care market is
not just that a depression in the quantity demanded
for insurance causes inefficiently high prices (the
theory that Justice Antonin Scalia posited during
argument23). Instead, self-insurance substantially
affects the health-care market by allowing individuals to make less-efficient choices about health-care
purchasing, driving up health-care costs for everyone even if all self-insured health care is fully bought
and paid for.
In the end, among those who understand the
unique interrelationship of the health insurance and
health-care markets, there is no room for doubt that
the individual mandate is a regulation of economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.

Postargument Concerns
If the question is so easy under current doctrine
and with a basic knowledge of health insurance functioning, why did the oral arguments go so badly awry?
The problem arose almost immediately in the justices’ questions and in Solicitor General Donald
Verrilli’s responses: Everybody in the room either
failed to grasp the interrelationship of health insurance and health care or was unwilling to admit that
health insurance manipulates savings and consumption incentives. That is, the legal scholars who were
so confident before argument had understood something that the justices and advocates did not, but
we had also failed to understand an important political constraint on what the government was willing to
argue.
Of course, Solicitor General Verrilli repeatedly
asserted that health care is unique.24 But his point
was not that health insurance is unusual insurance
with a unique relationship to its subject market,
health care. His point was just that everyone will
someday need health care, that no one can predict
when, that the cost is likely to be prohibitive, and
that the cost will shift to others if it is not covered
by third-party insurance.25 The problem with that
argument is that it simply identifies the risk that
self-insured individuals are choosing to bear. That
risk may be greater than or slightly different from
ordinary risks in ordinary insurance markets, but the
notion that self-insurance is a decision to bear one’s
own risk, and even that self-insurance can expose
others in the market to cost shifting, is identical in
all insurance contexts, as Justice Samuel Alito pointed
out early in the argument with a question about burial
insurance.26 In short, the government’s entire “health
care is unique” argument identified a mere portion,
and the least important, least unique portion, of what
health insurance provides.
www.chestpubs.org

At one point in the argument, Justice Scalia asserted,
“These people [the currently uninsured] are not
stupid. They’re going to buy insurance later. They’re
young and need the money now. When they think
they have a substantial risk of incurring high medical
bills, they’ll buy insurance, like the rest of us.”27
This argument gave Solicitor General Verrilli a clear
opening to discuss health insurance’s function of
smoothing health-care savings across patients’ lives
and to discuss the incentives that health insurers
create for the currently young and apparently healthy
to consume preventive care. But Solicitor General
Verrilli forwent the opportunity, answering Justice
Scalia with the same narrow kind of response that
he had given in asserting that health care is unique.
He said that waiting to buy insurance is the core
problem in a system with guaranteed issue because
it causes prices to rise and, ultimately, insurance
markets to fail.28 He is right, of course, that adverse
selection in health insurance is part of the problem,
but that point does not help establish that health
insurance and health care are unique. Adverse selection (and the information asymmetries between
insurance companies and their customers as to their
customers’ risk profiles, which allow adverse selection to occur) is a pervasive problem in insurance
markets. To establish that self-insurance for health
care is an economic activity with substantial effects
on interstate commerce, in a way that self-insurance
for burials, cars, and homes is not, Solicitor General
Verrilli needed to say much more.
But this is where the scholarly critique shows too
little understanding about health care. Solicitor
General Verrilli undoubtedly knew that he was identifying a small portion of the relevant arguments. It
is simply implausible that the solicitor general of
the United States, who knew that this case would
be the biggest of the year and perhaps of his career,
had not learned enough about health insurance to
be able to discuss the salutary influences of costsharing manipulations, optimism bias corrections,
medical necessity review, and referral requirements.
So why did he not discuss them?
The problem is that there is a deeply felt political constraint that motivates a unique kind of skepticism toward a health insurance mandate, preventing
the Obama Administration’s lawyer, in the middle of
an election year, from admitting the true efficiencies
of health insurance: Americans do not want to be
manipulated in their health-care consumption choices.
Purchase incentives for mortgages (such as the mortgage interest deduction) are fine; purchase incentives
for fuel efficient cars (such as tax credits and carpool
lane access for hybrids) are fine; the states’ purchase
mandates for car insurance are fine. But a purchase
mandate for health insurance, justified by reference
CHEST / 141 / 6 / JUNE, 2012
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to insurance’s incentive structure for health-care consumption? That sounds like rationing. Solicitor General Verrilli did not want to be heard as saying, “We
didn’t include a government death panel, don’t worry.
We’ll just make you enter into a private, contractual
death panel—a health insurance policy that will steer
your consumption decisions to improve the market’s
efficiency.” It was politically safer to say that we all
pay for each other’s health care already and that those
without insurance free ride on cross-subsidized emergency rooms, even if those points fail to distinguish
health insurance from other kinds of insurance.
Importantly, I am not mocking the Tea Party here
or disparaging the solicitor general’s performance.
Direct government rationing of health care might
in fact be unconstitutional,29-30 and there is certainly
a strong political constraint that prevents regulatory
rationing from becoming law. Of course, the perception that health insurance is the same thing as
a death panel or that a purchase mandate for such
insurance approaches a constitutionally problematic
line is alarmist and misguided. But that perception
is also pervasive.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court is not going to
adopt an alarmist account of the individual mandate,
holding that the ACA amounts to unconstitutional
rationing. So how will the justices escape, if they do,
the precedent that allows Congress to regulate intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce? Again, predicting outcomes from
oral arguments is dangerous, but the theory that the
conservative justices seemed to be pursuing was
that there is a constitutionally important distinction
between regulating commerce that exists in the world
and creating commerce where none existed before.31
This distinction would be brand new to American
constitutional law and it might threaten the many
provisions of the United States Code that attempt
to stimulate commerce by providing positive incentives for individuals to buy things (tax deductions
and credits), in addition to invalidating the negative
incentive in the ACA’s penalty for failure to buy health
insurance. But the Court seems tempted to draw this
new line, holding at a minimum that Congress may
not use penalties to stimulate markets.
Such a holding would misunderstand the purposes
of the individual mandate and of health insurance
generally. But you cannot really blame the Supreme
Court or even President Obama’s legal team. Americans are not ready to accept that we need help,
beyond our doctor’s, in making medical decisions.
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